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Ely, Black, Grotius & Vattel
PATRICK 0. GUDRIDGE*
The force (and importance) of War and Responsibility1 is mainly
the product of Chapters Two and Three, dealing with the sorry role that
Congress played in authorizing the Vietnam War and the conclusions
that seem to follow given recognition of that role. My focus here, how-
ever, is Chapter One. A very different conception of the Constitution's
approach to war ultimately emerges, I believe, if we read closely John
Ely's introductory remarks.
The implications of this alternative conception are strong: First,
presidential use of military force requires a prior congressional declara-
tion of war only if, along with the use of force, the President means to
alter the ordinary legal rights of American citizens or other persons who
come within the protection of the United States Constitution. Thus, for
example, a presidential military effort accompanied by relocation of
United States residents to internment camps, or by a regime of press
censorship, would presuppose a declaration of war-or rather, in the
absence of such a declaration, these accompaniments might well be
unconstitutional. Second, arguments invoking wartime necessities are
not properly part of constitutional law absent congressional declaration.
On this view, well-known Cold War and Vietnam War free speech cases
are especially vulnerable to criticism.
These conclusions, however, are not the main topic of this Essay.
Instead, I undertake a series of excursions. Ely's discussion-or rather
its limits-leads me to retrieve (in turn) Justice Black's opinion in The
Steel Seizure Case; the language of the declaration of war of the War of
1812, along with some related statutes; and the analyses of declarations
of war in the works of Grotius and Vattel. In the end, however, the
Grotian argument becomes central: the chief inspiration for the reread-
ing of United States constitutional law that I propose.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Bernard Oxman, Michael
Froomkin, and Laurence Tribe helpfully criticized earlier drafts of this essay. Anne Klinefelter
and Beth Gwynn-with characteristic excellence-marshalled library resources. Nicolo Trocker
offered knowledge and encouragement. Gaps and lapses are my doing. I take up in more detail
some of the methodological and substantive issues raised by Part V of this essay in a larger work
in progress, tentatively titled "Constitutional Law and Formal Revolution."
1. JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH (1993).
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I.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that "Congress shall
have Power... To declare War .... "2 Ely understands this language to
mean "Acts of war must be authorized by Congress."3 Chapter One of
War and Responsibility can be read (without denying its other aims) as a
defense of this translation. The gist of its argument appears at the
outset:
The power to declare war was constitutionally vested in Congress.
The debates, and early practice, establish that this meant that all wars,
big or small, "declared" in so many words or not-most weren't,
even then-had to be legislatively authorized.'
"Declare" is obviously the key term. Ely at one point notes author-
ity for the proposition that "declare war" and "commence war" were
"synonymous" well before the end of the eighteenth century.' At
another point, however, he observes that "declare war" was a formula
added relatively late in the constitutional drafting process, substituting
for the earlier phrase "make war."'6 The initial wording, Ely concludes,
seemed to the framers to suggest an improper overlap of the congres-
sional role and the executive responsibility as commander in chief. In
particular, "make war" raised a question about advance congressional
authorization of executive use of military forces to repel sudden attacks.7
Plainly, therefore, the framers appreciated the difference between
" 'declared' in so many words" and "commence." 8 But did they also
assume that there was a difference between " 'declared' in so many
words" and "or not," between "declared" and "authorized"? 9 Ely cites
Alexander Hamilton's observation that "the ceremony of a formal
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. For criticism of Ely's reading of "declare war" making use
of resources more familiar than I will use, see Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John
Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92
MICH. L. Rv. 1364 (1994). For a useful guide to the "declare war" secondary literature
generally, see Peter D. Coffman, Power and Duty: The Language of the War Power, 80 CORNELL
L. REv. 1236, 1240-41 n.30 (1995) (book review).
3. ELY, supra note 1, at 10.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 142 n.21 (citing David Gray Adler, The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking:
The Enduring Debate, 103 POL. Scl. Q. 1, 6 (1988)).
6. ELY, supra note 1, at 5.
7. Id.
8. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
.. .engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.").
9. "Authorized" is itself a complex term. Must authorization be express or is tacit approval
also authorization? If authorization must be explicit, questions would then arise as to whether
"declarations of war" are authorizations possessing a particular form, and whether (and why) this
particular form is necessary. Later in this essay, I will suggest that declarations of war serve a
distinct purpose, distinguishing such declarations from other forms of explicit authorization
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denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse."'" Hamilton's point
(he was arguing against a constitutional ban on raising armies in peace-
time) was the observed practice of foreign governments." I It is not easy,
therefore, to draw any definite conclusion from this remark per se about
practice under the proposed United States Constitution. 12
There are intimations in the Philadelphia debates and the framers'
subsequent statements that "declaring" war was a practice crucially
involving the use of language, indeed language of relatively definite
form. According to James Madison's notes, Oliver Ellsworth spoke in
favor of the Madison/Gerry motion to replace "make war" with "declare
war," inter alia observing, "War also is a simple and overt declara-
tion.""3 Madison himself, writing in The Federalist about Article I, Sec-
tion 10, appears to make an analogous assumption about definite form:
The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old system,
but is somewhat extended in the new. According to the former, let-
ters of marque could be granted by the States after a declaration of
war; according to the latter, these licenses must be obtained, as well
during war as previous to its declaration, from the government of the
United States.
1 4
Is "a declaration of war" like "letters of marque" in the sense that they
are both documents of definite form? The powers to declare war and
issue letters of marque and reprisal, after all, are listed together in Arti-
cle I, Section 8. Madison's passage, although it does plainly distinguish
between "war" and "its declaration," is ultimately opaque. But both
Ellsworth and Madison do seem to suppose that to "declare war" is to
engage in what we would call today a "performative utterance," and thus
at least to raise (for us) the question of whether this is a speech act
possessing some sort of necessary distinctive mark. 15 These fragments,
however, like Hamilton's remark, do not clearly resolve the underlying
duality that the framers plainly perceived-the overlap of war as a state
of affairs and as an act (performance) of state. 6
(although, in the process, limiting the circumstances in which such declarations might be
necessary). See discussion infra part V.
10. See Ely, supra note 1, at 140 n.5.
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 149-50 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1888).
12. I will argue later in this essay that, read against the backdrop of Grotius and Vattel,
Hamilton's reference to "denunciation" may, in fact, be significant. See discussion infra part V.
13. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 476
(Adrienne Koch ed., 1966).
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 277 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
15. See J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 117 (2d ed. 1975).
16. On war as a state of affairs, see THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888) ("a war breaks out"). See also JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING
INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, & THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 151 (1993)
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II.
There are some terms in the language in which the framers wrote
the Constitution whose meanings are lost to us.' 7 In this case, though,
there are approaches still to be tried. I take as specific inspiration Justice
Black's majority opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.'8
Black (we remember) repeatedly rejected claims of constitutional
authority for President Truman's seizure of the steel industry by insis-
tently asserting the existence of a clear-cut distinction between legisla-
tive and executive power. Thus, the Commander in Chief clause was
inapposite because it does not grant power "to take possession of private
property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production" since
"[t]his is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authori-
ties."" Also: "In the framework of our Constitution, the President's
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he
is to be a lawmaker."2 Black stressed that Article I, Section 1 grants
"[a]ll legislative Powers" to Congress. 2' The Necessary and Proper
Clause, he noted, authorizes Congress to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ...all ...Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof."2 z
This is all question-begging, of course. Why was the steel industry
seizure "lawmaking"? Black's answer is notable:
The President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be
executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presi-
dential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.
The preamble of the order itself, like that of many statutes, sets out
reasons why the President believes certain policies should be
adopted, proclaims these policies as rules of conduct to be followed,
and again, like a statute, authorizes a government official to promul-
gate additional rules and regulations consistent with the policy pro-
claimed and needed to carry that policy into execution.23
The executive order looked like a statute.
How do we know what a statute looks like? At one level, we might
(noting "the tension in the Declaration [of Independence] between the description of independence
as the necessary consequence of George's actions, and the document's own status as a
performative utterance").
17. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 460-63
(1978).
18. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
19. Id. at 587.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 587-88.
22. See id. at 588.
23. Id.
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think that Justice Black was making a claim of personal authority. Sena-
tor/Justice Black certainly knew a statute when he saw one. But we can
also see that Black's formulation evoked a very specific picture of a
statute-a statute contains a statement of purpose, rules expressing that
purpose, and authorization to administrators to adopt further rules to
elaborate the statutory rules. The model that Black brought to bear, we
know immediately, is the shorthand form of every New Deal enact-
ment.2 4 As constitutional law, therefore, Black's argument is method-
ologically provocative. It resolves the question of constitutional
construction, not by reading the Constitution directly, but by reading
another document-the executive order-and comparing it with yet
another document-the statutory form.25
The question I have been raising thus becomes whether (like the
power to "make all Laws") the constitutional grant of power to Congress
to "declare War" can be associated with a model with which arguably
improper executive action might be compared and therefore judged. We
might-were we to follow Black precisely-take the World War II dec-
laration of war against Japan as this model. In applying his approach,
however, there is no reason to suppose that we are limited to using
Black's New Deal model. Given Ely's initial preoccupation with the
views of the framers, a more apt point of departure for present purposes
is the declaration of war closest to the period of constitutional drafting:
the declaration of war for the War of 1812. (James Madison's presi-
dency also singles out this declaration as particularly interesting.)
This is the text:
An Act declaring War between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of
America and their territories.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled, That war be and the
same is hereby declared to exist between the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof, and the
United States of America and their territories; and that the President
of the United States is hereby authorized to use the whole land and
naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to
24. See Patrick Gudridge, Ripeness Within the Legislative Interpretation of Case or
Controversy (December 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussing New Deal
statutory form from a more technical perspective); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405 (1989).
25. Black's argument assumes that it is possible, in principle, for an executive order to take a
form plainly different from the form of a statute. The crucial difference, it appears, lies in the
claim (or denial) of originality. For Black, an executive order should purport to interpret a statute,
to derive policies or organizing principles from statutes. Statutes themselves, on this view, claim
an initial status, purporting to be first articulations of governmental agendas.
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issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions or
letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think
proper, and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels,
goods, and effects of the government of the said United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, and the subjects thereof.2 6
The declaration is brief (plainly not a New Deal statute), but none-
theless suggests much.
First, like Black's model statute, the declaration is importantly a
delegation, authorizing the President to use "the whole" armed forces
and to issue commissions or letters of marque and reprisal to "private
armed vessels." Why was it necessary for the declaration to do anything
more than declare war? Why couldn't the President "use the whole land
and naval force of the United States" against Great Britain (given the
declaration of war) without specific authorization in the declaration
itself? The Constitution already named the President as Commander in
Chief. Why couldn't "private armed vessels" proceed "against the ves-
sels, goods, and effects" and "subjects" of Great Britain given a declara-
tion of war even in the absence of the specifically described process?
The Constitution separates, even as it juxtaposes, the powers to "declare
War" and to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." Perhaps this
enumeration explains the need the drafters felt to include the latter
authorization. Interestingly, the declaration both subordinates the ship
owners to the President (who issues and drafts their authorizing docu-
ments) and equates the President and the owners (both are treated as
requiring congressional authorization). In a sense, it is as though the
President and private ship owners are alike "owners" (as though that is
what "commander in chief" means), and that ownership is the status
acted upon.
Second, Congress returned to the question of letters of marque and
reprisal some eight days later.2 7 This lengthy, seventeen-part statute
defined the process for applying for letters of marque and reprisal, speci-
fied rules governing bounties, prizes and salvage, provided for treatment
of prisoners of war, imposed record-keeping requirements, and made
applicable the law of courts-martial. For present purposes, what is most
interesting about this statute is the assumption that its drafters made
about the status of the prior declaration of war, referred to in the marque
and reprisal statute as "an act entituled [sic] 'An act declaring war
between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the
dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territo-
26. Law of June 18, 1812, ch. CII, 2 Stat. 755 (1812).
27. Law of June 26, 1812, ch. CVII, 2 Stat. 759-64 (1812).
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ries.' "28 The declaration was (or was the same thing as) a statute-an
"act."
Third, "act" is, in fact, exactly right. The declaration, by its terms,
means to be itself decisive, itself a change in circumstances: "That war
be and the same is hereby declared to exist .... ." War now exists-is
now in being-because it is hereby declared. 29 This is precisely the
grammar of statutes per se, as even a quick glance at acts passed around
the time of the declaration shows:
"Be it enacted... That the President... shall have the power to
grant remissions ... ;3
"Be it enacted ... That all promissory notes... hereafter drawn
... within the county of Alexandria ... shall be governed by, and
subject to, the same laws as are now in force.., within the county of
Washington...;, 31
"Be it enacted... That the infantry of the army of the United
States shall consist of twenty-five regiments ....
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the compiler included the
1812 declaration of war as simply one of a list of acts arranged in chron-
ological order in the Statutes at Large.33
We are back to Justice Black. A declaration of war is a law. Since
the Constitution grants Congress legislative exclusivity ("all Laws" in
the words of the Necessary and Proper Clause-the residual completion
of the Article I, Section 8 list), presidential action that is in form a decla-
ration of war is unconstitutional. If this proposition is to do real work, it
necessarily supposes an account of which formal features of a declara-
tion of war matter. This account, we may think, in turn supposes some
sense of the assumptions underlying the conclusion that a declaration of
war is a law, of what circumstances justify this equation.
In this regard, the terms of a second statute following upon the
1812 declaration (this one some ten months later) are instructive:
An Act vesting in the President of the United States the power of
retaliation.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That in all and
every case, wherein, during the present war between the United
States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire-
land, any violations of the laws and usages of war, among civilized
28. Id. at 759.
29. See AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 57.
30. Law of June 17, 1812, ch. C, 2 Stat. 752 (1812).
31. Law of June 24, 1812, ch. CVI, 2 Stat. 755 (1812).
32. Law of June 26, 1812, ch. CVIII, 2 Stat. 764 (1812).
33. Cf id. at 786 (resolutions grouped separately).
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nations, shall be or have been done and perpetrated by those acting
under authority of the British government, on any of the citizens of
the United States or persons in the land or naval service of the United
States, the President of the United States is hereby authorized to
cause full and ample retaliation to be made, according to the laws and
usages of war among civilized nations, for all and every such viola-
tion as aforesaid.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That in all cases where any
outrage or act of cruelty or barbarity shall be or has been practiced by
any Indian or Indians, in alliance with the British government, or in
connexion with those acting under the authority of said government,
on citizens of the United States or those under its protection, the Pres-
ident of the United States is hereby authorized to cause full and
ample retaliation to be done and executed on such British subjects,
soldiers, seamen or marines, or Indians, in alliance or connexion with
Great Britain, being prisoners of war, as if the same outrage or act of
cruelty or barbarity had been done under the authority of the British
government.34
Congress authorized James Madison to order torture or execution
of British prisoners of war?35 Tabloid jurisprudence is not the point.
For present purposes, what is interesting is technique, the devices its
drafters used to define the terms of the Retaliation Act's project. The
first sentence is written as though it were a grant of subject-matter juris-
diction. Certain "violations of the laws and usages of war" are put
within the competence of the President, along with corresponding reme-
dies, also "according to the laws and usages of war." The statutory pro-
vision itself purports to function as an intermediary. It does not define
"violations" or "full and ample retaliation," but supposes that those
terms are defined elsewhere, within the body of international law that
the statute fixes as relevant for the President to take into account. The
second sentence repeats the term "full and ample retaliation," again
leaving it undefined. Instead, its principal task is an equation linking
"Indians" ("in alliance with... or in connexion with") and the British
government ("as if the same ... act ... had been done under the author-
ity of the British government") in order to establish a second equation of
"outrage" and "full and ample retaliation," notwithstanding the seeming
difference in the identities of the perpetrators and the punished. The ulti-
mate aim of both of these equations, evidently, was to establish a legal
34. Law of March 3, 1813, ch. LXI, 2 Stat. 829-30 (1813).
35. It appears that practices undertaken pursuant to the Retaliation Act were limited to
hostage taking, solitary confinement of hostages, and threatened executions. See Ralph Robinson,
Retaliation for the Treatment of Prisoners in the War of 1812, 49 Am. HIsT. Rav. 65 (1943); see
also JOHN K. MAHON, THE WAR OF 1812, at 224-25, 383 (1972) (discussing charges of atrocity
and mistreatment of prisoners of war).
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identity between the presidential conduct authorized in the first sentence
and that authorized in the second.36 Plainly, the Retaliation Act claims
for itself only a secondary status. It is not a primary rule.37 Instead, it
undertakes two quasi-logical operations (relevance-setting and substitu-
tion), rendering or attempting to render a larger body of law ("the laws
and usages of war") available for presidential use. Because the statute
plays this intermediary role, it can leave its key terms (such as "full and
ample retaliation") tactfully unspecified. Further detail, presumably, is
the province of the primary regime.
Derivative work of this sort was a principal business of statutes in
the first part of the nineteenth century.3" If a declaration of war, at the
time, was understood to be a "Law" akin to a statute, was a declaration
also similarly secondary, chiefly a trigger of some set of primary norms?
If so, it is likely (especially given the example of the Retaliation Act)
that "the laws and usages of war" would have been the regime brought
to bear. To identify the point of a declaration from the early nineteenth
century perspective, and, therefore, whether or not particular executive
action presupposes (would have presupposed) a declaration's congres-
sional enactment, a second look is in order-the view from (then) con-
temporary international law.
III.
"The international jurist most widely cited in the first fifty years
after the Revolution was ...Vattel. 39 Vattel, however, took as his
36. At the time, apparently, international law acknowledged the propriety of executing
prisoners of war in retaliation for enemy killing of prisoners "without any just reason." M. D.
VATTEL, THm LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT
AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 414 (trans. ed. 1820). Vattel, however, recommended
the threat of reprisal, rather than the act itself, as the better course:
Alexander the Great, having cause of complaint against Darius, for some mal-
practices, sent him word, that if he continued to make war in such a manner, he
would pursue him to the utmost, and give no quarter. It is thus an enemy violating
the laws of war is to be checked, and not by causing the penalty due to his crime to
fall on innocent victims.
Id. at 415.
37. The primary/secondary distinction, of course, is H.L.A. Hart's. See H.L.A. HART, TaE
CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961).
38. On the ready overlap of statutory and common law usages in this period, see William S.
Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 C.RDozo L.
REv. 799, 805-06 (1985). I describe my own reactions to reading early nineteenth century statutes
(in particular congressional enactments in 1825) elsewhere. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Legislation
in Legal Imagination: Historical Exercises-1825, 1875, 1925 (1984) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author).
39. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 462 n.12 (1978)
(citation omitted).
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point of departure "[t]he celebrated Grotius. 4 ° It is, therefore, De Jure
Belli ac Pacis to which I first turn.41 My purpose, though, is not simply
introductory. As we will see, a declaration of war within the Grotian
account is emphatically "legal" in character. The "legality," we will
also see, is both complex (reflecting and reproducing a particular poli-
tics) and surprising (the only individual right directly recognized con-
cerns the individual's relationship to her or his own state). Ultimately,
after I take up Vattel, it will become apparent that the Grotian account
supplies the most apt background against which to read the language of
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book III, Chapter III ("Of a just or solemn
War, according to the Right of Nations, and of its Denunciation"42),
begins with the proposition that a war is just "not from the Cause
whence it arises, nor, as elsewhere, from the great Actions done in it, but
from some peculiar Effects of Right. '4 3 Such "effects of right" are a
function of the identity of the parties to the war. The right to "make a
just War" vests only in "they that have Sovereign Power," and not "Cap-
tains of Thieves."'  Thus, lawful war is fought with states, including
states that "commit some acts of Injustice, even by publick Delibera-
tion," and not with "Compan[ies] of Pirates and Robbers," even though
"they may observe some kind of Equity among themselves, without
which no Body can long subsist."45 "But that War may be called just in
the Sense under Consideration, it is not enough that it is made between
Sovereigns, but ... it must be undertaken by publick Deliberation, and
so that one of the Parties declare it to the other."'46 This requirement is
not a matter of the law of nature which, for example, demands "no
40. VATTEL, supra note 36, at 4. "It appears from many passages in his excellent work, that
this great man had a glimpse of the truth: but as he broke up the land, if I may be allowed the
expression, and investigated an important subject, much neglected before his time, it is not
surprising that his mind, overcharged by an immense variety of objects and citations which
entered into his plan, he could not always acquire those distinct ideas so necessary in the
sciences." Id. at 5. For Vattel's references to Grotius (who was the only modem author cited) in
connection with the particular topic of declarations of war, see id. at 386.
41. HUGO GROTIus, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (Jean Barbeyrac ed., 1738). The
English translation of the Barbeyrac edition was published, obviously, relatively close to the
period of constitution-writing in the United States; Barbeyrac's elaborate notes are an important
additional resource. See also RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT 73 n.31 (1979) (stressing the importance of Barbeyrac's edition "in the intellectual
history of eighteenth-century England). But see A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR: PEACE, WAR,
AND JUSTICE IN HUGO GROTIUS vi (Onuma Yasnaki ed., 1973) ("Barbeyrac's translation is
strongly coloured by his own bold interpretations.").
42. GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 549.
43. Id. at 549-50.
44. Id. at 552.
45. Id. at 550.
46. Id. at 552-53.
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denouncing of War" if "Force is repelled by Force, or Punishment
demanded of him who is the Offender."47 Grotius is emphatic: "But by
the Law of Nations, a publick Denunciation is required in all Cases, as
to those peculiar Effects of a just War, if not on both Sides, yet on
one."
48
Declarations may be conditional or absolute. 49 Distinctive prac-
tices associated with declaring war, such as "throwing... a Spear into
the Enemy's Ground, "50 are simply "peculiar Customs" and not "Rules
which properly belong to the Law of Nations."' 51 A declaration of war
against a sovereign "is presumed at the same Time to be denounced, not
only against all his Subjects, but also others who shall join him, and who
ought to be considered, in Regard to him, only as an Accessory"
(although war fought against such associates after the conclusion of hos-
tilities vis-a-vis the principal requires a new declaration).5 2 The purpose
of a declaration of war is not "to shew that [the declarants] would do
nothing in Secret, or by Deceit. '53
But that is might manifestly appear, that the War is not made by a
private Authority, but by the Consent of both Nations, or of their
Sovereigns. For hence arise certain peculiar Effects, which in a War
against Robbers, or a War made by a Prince against his own Subjects,
will not be allowed.54
It is for this reason that a defensive war requires declaration ("to obtain
the Effects proper to a just War"); that wars occasioned by violations of
the rights of ambassadors require declaration; and that, notwithstanding
47. Id. at 553.
48. Id. at 555. In its original Latin, the emphatic legality of the Grotian account of
declarations of war would seem to be especially clear. The title of Book III, Chapter III, reads:
"De bellojusto sive solenni jure gentium, ubi de indictione." HUGO GRoTIuS, DE JURE BELLI AC
PAcis 670 (Amsterdam ed. 1712). Grotius subsequently associates "indictio" with "denuntiatio,"
see id. at 677, a term used throughout the chapter (and the origin, obviously, for the repeated use
of "denunciation" in the English translation of the Barbeyrac edition). "Denuntiatio" was a term
of art in Roman procedure, referring to types of summonses. See LEOPOLD WENGER, INSTITUTES
OF THE RoMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 85-86, 272-75 (Otis Harrison Fisk trans., 1940).
Concerning the reliance of Grotius upon Roman law forms, see DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN
MEASURE: SoCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 213-19 (1990); see also ALAN
WATSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARCHAIC ROME 20 (1993) (in early Roman practice,
"declarations of war have the form of a legis actio of private law," although he notes "that does
not mean they have the form of any one particular legis actio").
49. See GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 555.
50. Id. at 553 (second occurrence). [An eight-page section in Book III, Ch. III of the
Barbeyrac edition is misnumbered; therefore, some page numbers appear on duplicate pages.
When citing to such a page, we indicate to which occurrence of the page number the author is
referring. Eds.]
51. Id. at 554 (second occurrence).
52. Id. at 555 (second occurrence).
53. Id. at 556 (second occurrence).
54. Id. at 556-57 (second occurrence).
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"natural Right," a "Denunciation requires no Time to be allowed after
it."55
Manifestly technically adept; elegantly accommodating, distin-
guishing or disagreeing with prior writers (detail missing in the preced-
ing summary), Grotius seemingly reaches a technician's conclusion:
Declarations of war have no intrinsic meaning, but simply exist, accord-
ing to the law of nations, to make applicable the pertinent part of the law
of nations.5 6 His presuppositions, however, are remarkable. It is not as
though states are taken as given. "Nations, or . . .their Sovereigns"
compete with "private Authority,"57 pirates and robbers "confederated
only to do Mischief.' 58 Declarations are made to make clear the distinc-
tion; an important part of the elaborated law of declarations concerns
-who precisely is included (along with the named state) as the subject of
a declaration-again, the relevant actors are not simply supposed. But
from what perspective is it difficult to distinguish between states and
pirates and robbers? Attributes of individuals organize the famously
secular account of the law of nature, the attendant theory of natural
rights, and the description of just grounds for war that follows. 59 Indeed,
in the last of these accounts, Grotius takes private law as his point of
departure. "Now, as many Sources as there are of judicial Actions, so
many Causes may there be or War."' 60 Attention to the capacities of
individuals to interact, agreeing and disagreeing, and to their capacity as
well to act in their own interests, also shapes the notably skeptical polit-
ical theory.6' The well-known passage rejecting popular sovereignty as
necessarily relevant precisely illustrates this individualism (albeit
paradoxically):
And here we must first reject their Opinion, who will have the
Supreme Power to be always, and without Exception, in the People;
so that they may restrain or punish their Kings, as often as they abuse
their Power.... It is lawful for any Man to engage himself as a Slave
to whom he pleases; as appears both by the Hebrew and Roman
Laws. Why should it not therefore be as lawful for a People that are
55. Id. at 557 (second occurrence).
56. He makes the point more generally earlier: "Hermogenianus declares, that Wars were
introduced by the Law of Nations, which I think ought to be interpreted somewhat different from
what it generally is, iz. That the Law of Nations has established a certain Manner of making
War; so that those Wars which are comfortable to it, have, by the Rules of that Law, certain
peculiar Effects. Id. at 28.
57. Id. at 556 (second occurrence).
58. Id. at 552.
59. See id. at 1-23, 127-515.
60. Id. at 129.
61. On Grotius and skepticism, and the larger theme of the link between reason of state and
"modem" natural rights political theory, see RICHARD TUCK, PHILOSOPHY AND GOVERNMENT,
1572-1651, at 154-201 (1993).
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at their own Disposal, to deliver up themselves to any one or more
Persons, and transfer the Right of governing them upon him or them,
without reserving any Share or that Right to themselves?... But as
there are several Ways of Living, some better than others, and every
one may chuse which he pleases of all those Sorts; so a People may
chuse what Form of Government they please: Neither is the Right
which the Sovereign has over his Subjects to be measured by this or
that Form, of which divers Men have divers Opinions, but by the
Extent of the Will of those who conferred it upon him.62
In the government of a state, authority may not rest with the people,
because the people-perhaps making the best of a bad situation63-may
have so chosen. The Grotian point of view is ultimately individual. The
state, however authoritarian, is a product of individual choices. 6
It is, therefore, the viewpoint of individuals that encompasses the
panorama of contention and violence that Grotius subsumes under his
definition of war and that motivates his discussion of laws of war as a
means to peace. The state, within the Grotian account, appears as a
means of protection for individuals. It affords an alternative (some-
times) to self-help. Its own modes of operation (tend to) instantiate
legality. This is itself protection. "Dion Chrysostom is more in the
right, who says that the Law (especially that of Nations) is in a State, as
the Soul in a human Body, for that being taken away it ceases to be a
state. '65 This passage is characteristic. The classical metaphor, restated,
equates legality and reason of state, trustworthiness from the individual
perspective and state self-interest. In these terms it is not surprising that
it is the "law of nations" that is especially illustrative-states (them-
selves often provisional and artificial), interact, and therefore become
subject to constraint, in much the same way as individuals.
To what extent, however, did the law of nations as Grotius depicted
it actually protect individuals? Not much, it appears at first glance.
Chapters IV through VIII of Book III describe how, under the law of
62. GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 64.
63. "There may be many Causes why a People should renounce all Sovereignty in
themselves, and yield it to another: As when they are upon the Brink of Ruin, and they can find
no other Means to save themselves; or being in great Want, they cannot otherwise be supported.
Id. at 65.
64. "A Debt contracted by a free People, ceases not to be a Debt, because they are at present
under a King; for the People are the same, and they still retain a Property in those Things that
belonged to them as a People, and hold the Sovereignty too, tho' it be not exercised now by the
Body, but the Head." Id. at 266-67. The tension obviously present in the idea of individuals
bargaining away sovereignty and yet retaining priority is especially evident in this passage,
resolved only partly by the body-head metaphor. See also TUCK, supra note 61, at 199-200
(discussing this difficulty and its significance more generally).
65. GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 551. For a notable recent elaboration of this theme, see
BLANDINE KRIEGEL, THE STATE AND THE RULE OF LAW (M.A. LaPain & J.C. Cohen trans., 1995).
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nations, states at war may kill with impunity (or enslave) "not only those
who are actually in Arms, and the Subjects of the Prince engaged in
War, but also all those who reside within his Territories,"66 as well as
prisoners of war (even after unconditional surrender);67 how states,
allowed by the law of nations, may plunder or lay waste to an enemy's
country (including sacred places and tombs);68 how states and individu-
als may acquire absolute title to captured property;69 and how states, by
conquest, may acquire all rights of sovereignty of conquered states.70
These are, it appears, rights of aggression rather than protection. The
only defensive right that Grotius discusses at length (also the only right
mentioned in his account of declarations of war), is the right of postli-
minium. Individuals or people, who in war are subjugated by an enemy,
but who, also in the course of war, become free from this subjugation
reacquire prior rights, "as if ... never ... in the Enemy's power. '71
The prominence of postliminium in De Juri Belli ac Pacis is
revealing. Grotius might have treated the question of the rights of
returned prisoners of war as exclusively a matter of the law of particular
states. Alan Watson, for example, holds to this view: "Postliminium is
simply part of internal Roman private law."'7 2 But Grotius, aware of this
option, explicitly included postliminium within the law of nations,
although he also allowed for the possibility that domestic regimes might
alter the precise content of the right. 73 Grotius additionally recognized
that postliminium was not a matter of natural law. Concluding his
extended discussion of the details of the right, he observed: "But in our
Days, not only among Christians, but even most of the Mahometans, as
this Right of Captivity out of Time of War, so also that of Postliminity is
abolished, the Necessity of both ceasing because the Rights of that natu-
ral Relation, which is between all Mankind, have been re-established. '74
For the present purposes, it is the jurisprudence of this passage (and not
its ostensible optimism 75 ) that is important. The Grotian system, it is
easy to see, requires recognition of the right of postliminium given the
origin of the system in the posited tension between states and individu-
als. The status of individuals cannot be entirely contingent, a function
66. GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 562.
67. See id. at 565-66.
68. See id. at 573-78.
69. See id. at 579-601. Concerning captured persons as property, see id. at 602-08.
70. See id. at 608-11.
71. Id. at 616.
72. WATSON, supra note 48, at xii.
73. See GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 612, 618.
74. Id. at 625-26.
75. Grotius immediately proceeds to discuss a current French case decided through reference
to principles of postliminium. See id. at 626.
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solely of the fortunes of war. At the time, political arrangements are
understood to be artificial and therefore changeable.76 Status within
states is not simply "there," not something that of necessity (absent
express legal provision) survives interruption." Postliminium, thus,
must be defined "outside" states, a matter therefore for the law of
nations, even though for individuals it is chiefly a right vis-a-vis their
"own" states.78
This contingency of states, it turns out, is also a source of otherwise
missing wartime protection for individuals vis-a-vis an enemy. The con-
cluding chapters of Book III address "Moderation" as a limit, for exam-
ple, on killing enemies, 79 despoiling the enemy's country,80 making
captures,8 and acquiring dominion;82 and also "Faith" between enemy
states and individuals acting for states, in wartime itself, in concluding
wars, and in observing truces. 83 Punctuated throughout the pertinent
chapters by appeals to virtue of various sorts, Grotius' overarching argu-
ment appears most clearly in chapter XII ("Concerning Moderation in
regard to the Spoiling the Country of our Enemies, and such other
Things." 4) "But unless it be for some Advantage, it would be very fool-
ish to do another Damage, without any Profit to ones self."'8 5 Even right
motives, however, should be judged skeptically: "But if we rightly
weigh the Matter, such Things are for the most Part managed rather out
of Spite than wise Counsel: For very often either those inducing Rea-
sons cease, or there are others more powerful, that advise to the con-
trary."86 "Reasons . . . more powerful" are for Grotius difficult to
disentangle from self-interest (even in the case of religious
76. As if to emphasize the artifice of states and the priority of individuals, Grotius begins his
discussion of postliminium by parsing the term, depicting it as meaning simply "a return to the
Frontiers, id. at 612; the alternative view (as Barbeyrac explains it in his commentary) seems to
have joined "return" and a term connoting slavery, see id. at n.l(1).
77. For especially clear recognition of the problem, see W.W. BUCKLAND, THE ROMAN LAW
OF SLAVERY 307 (1908). See also ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 41-45 (1982) (view of slavery as "extrusive" or fallen state encompassing
individuals, including prisoners of war, whose conduct justifies their descent).
78. Not surprisingly, given the priority of individuals within his account, Grotius made use of
notions of waiver to fix the boundaries ofpostliminium. See GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 615, 616;
cf ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PERSONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 242-44 (1967)
(showing presence of both intentional and nonintentional conceptions of postliminium in Roman
law).
79. GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 630-49.
80. See id. at 649-58.
81. See id. at 658-59.
82. See id. at 669-76.
83. See id. at 686-735.
84. See id. at 649.
85. Id. at 650; see Onuma Yasuaki, Conclusion: Law Dancing to the Accompaniment of Love
and Calculation, in A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, supra note 41, at 347.
86. GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 650.
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obligations87).
Vertue itself, little esteemed in this Age, ought to forgive me, if,
whilst she is by herself, neglected, I endeavour to render her valuable
on the account of her Advantages. First then Moderation observed in
preserving those Things which do not lengthen out the War, takes
from the Enemy a powerfule Weapon, Desperation. 8
Grotius constructs long lists of people whom there may be no reason to
kill (including prisoners of war), property there may be no reason to
destroy, and rights of dominion there may be no reason to exercise.
The sense of contingency, the skepticism it encourages, and the
moderation that follows are not exclusively by-products of matters over
which states or individuals have no control. Grotius sanctions strategic
behavior. Thus, he devotes much of his initial discussion of good faith
to defending the obligation owed to a state who "through Fear has forced
a Promise from one."89
But a solemn War, that is, publick, and denounced on both Sides,
among other particular Effects of external Right, has also this, that
whatever Promises are made in that War, or for bringing it to a Con-
clusion, are so valid, that tho' they were occasioned by a Fear
unjustly caused, yet they cannot be made void without the Consent of
him to whom the Promise was made. Because as many other Things,
tho' in themselves not wholly innocent, are yet by the Law of Nations
reputed just, so is Fear, which in such a War is occasioned on either
Side; for if it were not allowed, such Wars, that are but too frequent,
could be neither moderated, nor concluded, which yet are very neces-
sary to be done for the good of Mankind.90
Promising is independent of truth-telling. "[A] promise of itself confers
a new Right." 91 It is a performative utterance; more precisely, it initiates
a constitutive interaction. "From this Society founded on Reason and
Speech, arises that Obligation from a Promise."92 The act of promising
itself suggests sequences of actions and responses, possibilities that
influence judgment and therefore restrain conduct. 93
Throughout the Grotian argument, we can see, "the negotiatory
87. "Therefore all Magistrates ought strictly to forbid these Things, for which they must
render an account for the unnecessary shedding of Blood to him, whose Viceregents they
are.. . ." Id. at 649.
88. Id. at 657.
89. Id. at 689; see id. at 688-91.
90. Id. at 691-92.
91. Id. at 687.
92. Id.
93. It is for this reason, Grotius argues, that promises made to pirates are binding, even if
"such Sort of People have not with others that particular Community, which the Law of Nations
hath introduced"-"if we treat [them] as such, it is to be understood, as if in that Respect, remitted
the Punishment." Id. at 688.
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character" of rights (of both individuals and states) is the key.94 Contin-
gency, self-interest, and strategy-the raw materials of both reason of
state and individual reason-are in war simultaneously the origins of the
formality of war and the rights of individuals.
IV.
Vattel approaches declarations of war differently.
[I]t is possible that the present fear of our arms may make an impres-
sion on the mind of an adversary, and induce him to do us justice.
We owe this farther regard to humanity, and especially to the lives
and tranquility of the subject, to declare to this unjust nation, or its
chief, that we at length are going to have recourse to the last remedy,
and make use of open force, for bringing him to reason. This is
called declaring war."''
The point of view now is plainly that of the state. "[T]he sovereign
power has alone authority to make war."96 The law of nations becomes
a proper subset of natural law generally, "the science of the law sub-
sisting between nations and states, and of the obligations that flow from
it."'97 "[T]o form an exact knowledge of this law, it is not sufficient to
know what the law of nature prescribes to the individuals of the human
race."
98
"The right of making war belongs to nations only as a remedy
against injustice . . . ,,99 Injustice is injury; because the state is the
relevant unit, it must be "the nation to which an injury has been done, or
is preparing to be done."100 The definition of such injury summarizes
Vattel's fundamental principle: "The whole right of the nation, and con-
sequently of the sovereign, proceeds from the good of the state, and by
this rule it is to be measured."'1' Much of the bulk of The Law of
Nations, preceding the relatively late discussion of war, supplies content
for this proposition. Vattel elaborately describes the proper agendas of
states considered individually and relative to each other, 02 thereby spec-
ifying a detailed conception of "the good of the state," which substitutes
94. Richard Tuck, Rights and Pluralism, in PHILOSOPHY IN AN AGE OF PLURALISM: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES TAYLOR IN QUESTION 168 (J. Tully ed., 1994).
95. VATTEL, supra note 36, at 381.
96. Id. at 357. "Public war is that betwixt nations or sovereigns, and carried on in the name
of the public power, and by its order. This is the war we are here to consider ...." Id. at 356.
97. Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 381.
100. Id. at 368.
101. Id. at 369.
102. See id. at 57-340.
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precisely for the individual rights-based enumeration serving a similar
purpose in De Jure Belli ac Pacis.
It is as itself "a remedy against injustice" that the declaration of war
figures most prominently in Vattel's scheme: "[A] farther trial for ter-
minating the difference without the effusion of blood by making use of
the principle fear, for bringing an enemy to more equitable sentiments
.... "103 A declaration will ordinarily "set forth the cause."" ° It "must
be made known to the state against whom it is made."10 5 "[A]ll oppro-
brious words are to be avoided, together with every expression indicat-
ing hatred, animosity and rage; as these can only excite the like
sentiments in the enemy." 106 "If the enemy ... offers equitable condi-
tions of peace, the war is to be suspended .... ,0 Vattel does not
ignore, however, the very different account that Grotius had offered in
De Jure Belli ac Pacis:
Besides the foregoing reasons, it is necessary for a nation to publish
the declaration of war for the instruction and direction of its own
subjects, in order to fix the date of the rights belonging to them from
the moment of this declaration, and relatively to certain effects which
the voluntary law of nations attributes to a war in form.' 0 8
A more precise terminology, therefore, is useful. "This publication of
the war may be called declaration, and that which is notified directly to
the enemy, denunciation .... 09
As this distinction itself perhaps illustrates, Vattel by and large
marginalizes Grotian preoccupations. The "voluntary law of nations,"
whose effects vis-a-vis individuals a declaration fixes, is simply a set of
conventions emerging because, at the limit, the law of nature and thus
the law of nations is a matter of "the conscience of sovereigns." Work-
ing rules must, therefore, come into existence that do not presuppose
actual knowledge of conscience." 0 These working rules are variations
on a single proposition: "a war in form, as to its effects, is to be
accounted just on both sides." ' For example, "every acquisition
obtained by war in form, is valid, independently of the justice of the
cause .... 9912 Postliminium rights of individuals are both a matter of
convention and the national character of war. "If the war be just, they
103. Id. at 382.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 385.
107. Id. at 382.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 385.
110. Id. at 446.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 449.
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were unjustly taken, and thus nothing is more natural than to restore
them as soon as it becomes possible. If the war be unjust, they are not
bound to bear the calamities of it more than any other part of the
nation."' 13 Limits on killing prisoners of war derive not so much from a
contingency-driven general rule of moderation, but from the remedial
role of war itself. "On an enemy's submitting and delivering up his
arms, we cannot with justice take away his life.""' 4 The affirmative case
for stratagems, similarly, does not emerge as a concomitant of circum-
stances generally, but again as a case of "the mildest means."' " 5
V.
Grotius and Vattel supply a provocative context within which we
might reconsider the language of the Framers and the Constitution.
Hamilton's reference to "the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war"
seems to follow Vattel precisely. We may wonder whether the constitu-
tional "declare" also ought to be read in light of The Law of Nations.
But as a result, given Vattel's distinction between denunciations and
declaration, the relevant definition would therefore be Grotian, identify-
ing a declaration of war as a legislative act marking a shift in governing
law, especially relevant for persons citizens of, or otherwise under the
protection of the United States.
It is certainly possible, in the light of this reading of Article I, Sec-
tion 8, to identify other constitutional provisions exhibiting Grotian ten-
dencies. The Article III, Section 3 definition of treason as "levying
War" obviously supposes that war (in some sense) might be privately as
well as governmentally instigated." 6 The Third Amendment expressly
differentiates that legal concomitants of peace and war, excluding from
its ban on quartering soldiers "in any house" quartering "in time of war
... in a manner... prescribed by law.""' 7 The 1812 declaration of war
is also consistent. We can readily note the absence of justification: there
is nothing suggestive of Vattel's last plea. The letters of marque provi-
sion, authorizing prize-taking by privately-owned ships, overlaps public
aims and endorsement of a particular mode of private property acquisi-
tion. The declaration's statutory form, coupled with the particular pos-
ture of legal intermediation that form suggests, readily brings to mind
the choice of law possibility.
We will soon see, however, that at least some pertinent constitu-
113. Id. at 457.
114. Id. at 414.
115. Id. at 438.
116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
117. U.S. CONST. amend III.
1995]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tional texts may be open to Grotian readings, but certainly do not require
(and may also be read to resist) such glosses. I do not claim, moreover,
that Hamilton or other framers consciously drew Vattel's distinction.
The understanding of "declare War" that I have put forward, therefore,
supposes a constitutional jurisprudence not limited to the simplest
"originalism." I do not propose to elaborate that jurisprudence here. It
is enough for present purposes to note consequences-to trade on what
(I think) are appealing (or at least intriguing) results of inserting a late
eighteenth century acknowledgement of an early seventeenth century
perspective within late twentieth century constitutional law. I conclude
this essay with three observations, initial sketches of some of the conse-
quences of the Grotian view for current constitutional law.
First, within this view the introduction of United States military
personnel into combat or near-combat does not by itself trigger a consti-
tutional requirement of a declaration of war. The main point of a decla-
ration becomes the change it makes in the legal regime within which
United States noncombatants find themselves. Particular exercises in
combat or near-combat would presuppose a declaration only if such
exercises (or linked activities) would somehow alter the circumstances
of United States noncombatants in ways that the change in legal regime
addresses. As a result, the declaration of war clause of Article I, Section
8 is not a constitutional restatement of John Ely's contention that non-
trivial United States combat commitments generally require congres-
sional authorization. Sometimes declarations of war will be necessary,
sometimes not. It does not follow, of course, that Ely's conclusion is
wrong. The interplay of other constitutional provisions may carry strong
implications-perhaps, for example, the combination of the Article II
juxtaposition of "executive" and "commander in chief" and the Article I
linkage of expenditures, "appropriations," and "law. 9118
Second, the central question becomes the content of the legal norms
that a declaration activates. We no longer ordinarily conceive of law in
terms which assign to judicial opinions or statutes the role of initiating,
or otherwise bringing to bear, entire preexisting systems of jurispru-
dence. To be sure, we still conceive of such systems. However, we
think of them as built up or constituted by opinions or statutes-a kind
of reversed polarity. As a result, our conceptions of movements across
regimes are typically formulated in terms of movements from one legal
instrument or set of legal instruments to another. One collection of
cases gives way to another; or a statute substitutes for cases; or constitu-
tional provisions and associated judicial opinions substitute for statutes
118. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641-46 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); ELY, supra note 1, at 142-43 n.22.
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or administrative orders. If a declaration of war is a legal switch, it must
(now) effect this sort of movement. War in law (now) is in form an
accumulation of executive orders and statutes. If this accumulation
replaces or reverses priority vis-a-vis other legal instruments, the obvi-
ous "other" is the Constitution, or at least one or more of its parts. And
if the particular importance of a declaration of war lies in its impact on
the legal environment that individuals confront, its chief rearranging of
priorities should concern the Bill of Rights. A declaration of war, on
this view, is akin to a declaration of a state of siege or other emergency
authority provided for, for example, in many Latin American constitu-
tions. 119 It is also similar, within the United States Constitution, to the
suspension proviso of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, allowing Congress
to limit the availability of the writ of habeas corpus "when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.' 120
Caveat: The provisions of the Bill of Rights do not on their face
distinguish war and peace in addressing the circumstances of persons
who are not members of the military (the Fifth Amendment does not
require grand jury indictment in "cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger")-except (as we have seen) for the Third Amendment. Expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius? Important parts of the Bill of Rights,
however, marked departures from British practice (were in this sense
new), or stated propositions that, whatever their implications in detail,
were of importance initially because they expressed presuppositions of
American government: starting points, not conclusions. (Madison, we
know, initially thought that inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Consti-
tution either unnecessary or inevitably restrictive of what were supposed
to be general propositions.) Reading the Bill of Rights standing alone to
be what the courts have subsequently made it-phrasings evoking or
encoding often complex legal structures, phrasings on this view amena-
ble to traditionally "legal" interpretation-is therefore arguably
anchronistic (to be sure, not necessarily wrong, but not self-evidently
right either).
More recently, in any case, the idea that in time of war government
may disregard otherwise relevant individual rights is, if not universally
acknowledged, more or less commonplace. Limitations on ordinary just
compensation rights and acknowledgements of the propriety of war cen-
119. For discussion of one recent constitution's approach to such provisions, see Keith S.
Rosenn, Brazil's New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional
Society, 38 AM. J. CoMp. L. 773, 790-91 (1990).
120. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of
Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1390-91 (1989) (discussing briefly the framers' conception of war
power as emergency power).
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sorship are perhaps the most obvious examples. 12' Declarations of
emergency are not novel either. At least in the past half-century, how-
ever, such declarations have been mostly executive work or general con-
gressional authorizations. 2 2 These declarations have not, it appears,
themselves functioned as constitutional switches. Instead, constitutional
law, at least as judicially characterized, frequently represents questions
of emergency as already prefigured in constitutional grants of authority
or, more importantly for present purposes, as already acknowledged in
definitions of individual rights. For most judges, almost all such rights
are, in the end, rights to demand justifications for government action.
To be sure, much work must be done along the way to determine what
sort of justification is necessary, and it is in this process (perhaps) that
theories of rights per se matter. But the result remains, in important part,
apologetics. For example, judgments that First Amendment protections
are inapplicable take the form of judicial descriptions of the sorts of
government objectives that justify limitations of free speech or free asso-
ciation. Within constitutional law of this sort there is no need for a war
switch as such.
If a war switch were to be meaningful, constitutional protections of
individual rights (absent a declaration of war) would have to be framed
in terms which would either not credit war aims as justifications for
limiting rights or prohibit war measures outright (assuming that such
measures could be defined). Within this regime, for example, the opin-
ion of Justice Douglas in New York Times Co. v. United States123 cap-
tures the gist of that case exactly. Assertion of "the power to wage war
successfully" as justification for prior restraint was out of order because
"the war power stems from a declaration of war."'12
4
Third, if this way of regarding declarations of war were to take
hold, it might reduce a felt need to frame constitutional rights jurispru-
dence with an eye to the appropriateness of usual formulations in the
121. Concerning just compensation rights in wartime, see, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); United States v. Caltex, Inc. 344 U.S. 149, 153-56 (1952).
With respect to censorship, see, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). I discuss the limits of these limits infra.
122. See Lobel, supra note 118, at 1407-09, 1412-16.
123. 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (per curiam).
124. Id. at 722 (Douglas, J., concurring). Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), might present an
illustration of a government practice-United States military surveillance of United States
citizens-which would be per se unconstitutional absent a declaration of war. Arguably, absent
war authority or perhaps congressional suspension of habeas corpus, the Constitution provides no
ground for this form of executive action. If the constitutional violation is the constitutionally
unauthorized surveillance itself, and not any consequent inhibition of free speech, plaintiffs would
presumably possess a justiciable claim. Cf. N.E. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v.
City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993) (challenge to discriminatory rule itself rather than its
consequences is justiciable).
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extreme conditions of wartime, and consequently, perhaps, with an eye
also to limiting the scope of ordinary jurisprudence to clear cases and
formulas.1 5 Given a declaration of war, usual constitutional rights juris-
prudence would be inapplicable. This may seem to be too much putting
a good face on a bad situation. The proposition that the Bill of Rights
does not apply in wartime might be reason enough to reject the idea of
declarations of war as constitutional switches. Of course, it is not clear
how much effect constitutional protections of individual rights had in
either World War I or World War 11.126 In any case, recognition of
individual rights is not the only form constitutional limits take. Federal
legislation or executive action affecting individuals would still require
constitutional authorization; still need to display some measure of rela-
tionship to "War," or war aims. At minimum, a regime-shifting inter-
pretation of the constitutional function of declarations of war would
seem to carry with it the corollary that legislation or executive orders
implementing a declaration clearly exhibit, in some way or another, the
distinctly war-related reasons underlying whatever actions they might
order or authorize. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. 127 need not be read as
utterly open-ended, notwithstanding its conclusion that "post-war" is
still "wartime" for at least some regulatory purposes. Duncan v.
Kahanamoku,12 8 limiting the reach of martial law in Hawaii, illustrates a
more restrictive approach. World War II-era just compensation law sup-
plies another example, seeming to distinguish between noncompensable
wartime regulation or destruction of private property, thus government
action on its face peculiar to war, and compensation-owing military pro-
curement, in principle no different in peace or war.t 29 Judgments about
sources of power at the height of war may be just as vulnerable to the
urgencies of the moment as judgments about the degree of constraint
125. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 449 (1985).
126. But see West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). We remember
the famous phrase----"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox .... Id. at 642. But in the Barnette
case itself, the officials requiring the flag salute were state, not federal, and the Supreme Court's
decision-as Justice Jackson carefully noted, see id. 638 & nn. 17 & 18 -was entirely consistent
with relevant congressional actions. Arguably, the Court might have disposed of the case on the
basis of constitutional preemption. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). My analysis
does not require the erasure (in effect) of Justice Jackson's opinion, but it does call attention to the
relatively "safe" context the case supplied Jackson for purposes of evoking the "many freedoms
that we hold inviolable as to those in civilian life," Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at 642 n.19.
127. 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
128. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
129. Compare United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) and United
States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (no compensation required) with United States v.
Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) and United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373
(1945).
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imposed by constitutional rights. This last conclusion suggests, if it sug-
gests anything, the possible value of formally segregating war for pur-
poses of constitutional law.1 30 Nonmartial constitutional law, at least,
has a chance to develop unimpeded by the implications of the extreme
case.
The Cold War and the Vietnam War are the crucial contexts, how-
ever. It is enough to compare Justice Black's majority opinion in
Kahanamoku, almost casually depicting centuries of commitment to
marginalizing martial law,13 ' with the anti-Communist subversive
organization cases decided only a few years later. Chief Justice Vin-
son's majority opinion in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds
displays an obvious anxiety-"freedoms themselves are dependent
upon the power of constitutional government to survive;"'13 2 his plurality
opinion in Dennis v. United States is similarly alarmed-"[o]verthrow
of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial
enough interest for the Government to limit speech." 33 Civil courts
remain open (the issue in Kahanamoku), but First Amendment law is
now being framed within the perceived necessities of a constructive state
of siege. 1
34
It is enough as well to compare United States v. O'Brien135 with
Texas v. Johnson'36 -the draft card burning and flag burning cases.
O'Brien (or at least John Ely's reading of the case 137) supplies the
organizing framework for Justice Brennan's opinion in Johnson.138
Brennan, however, celebrates "the joust of principles" confident of the
outcome-"nobody can suppose that this one gesture of an unknown
man will change our Nation's attitude towards its flag."' 139 In O'Brien
itself, Chief Justice Warren barely notes the Vietnam War, making one
oblique reference to "the war," 4° and the political protest out of which
130. Within Lobel's terms, therefore, my proposal is (in result at least) traditionally liberal.
See Lobel, supra note 120.
131. See 327 U.S. at 319-24.
132. 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950).
133. 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
134. Douds and Dennis thus reversed the approach that Max Radin borrowed from Second and
Third Republic France and recommended for United States use during World War II: "It
expedites and simplifies procedure but it assumes the obligation to maintain law and the
constitutional guaranties substantially intact." Max Radin, Martial Law and the State of Siege, 30
CAL. L. REv. 634, 640 (1942).
135. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
136. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
137. John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 1482 (1975).
138. See 491 U.S. at 403.
139. Id. at 418, 418-19.
140. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (quoting O'Brien's
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the case arose. 4' Much of the bulk of the opinion is a meditation on the
vulnerabilities and needs of large record-keeping systems.' 42 Conscrip-
tion, of course, is not a uniquely wartime exercise. Its requirements,
however, are made to seem like substitutes for the questions that we
might think that free speech jurisprudence would ask, questions aimed
precisely at determining whether ordinary administrative rationality
rather than specifically wartime management of dissent is the govern-
ment's preoccupation-in-chief. It is as though, in order to demonstrate
that the government's prohibition is not a response to political expres-
sion, the Supreme Court must censor itself. Or rather, we may suspect,
juxtaposition of the war, political protest, criminal prosecution, and the
government's clerical concerns might call attention to the difficulty of
the Court's argument, its refusal to assign priorities to constitutional and
bureaucratic values (or perhaps the priorities it actually does assign).
Douds, Dennis, and O'Brien are surely war cases. Kahanamoku
and Johnson are not-certainly chronologically, decided respectively in
1946 and 1989, definitive after years. But even Johnson and
Kahanamoku are not fully postliminial cases. Brennan knows who will
win "the joust." Black celebrates individual rights, but rights necessarily
within (or the results of) government institutions. The Grotian picture is
missing: both governments and individuals, neither achieving definite
priority, both therefore complexly dealing with the other. If declarations
of war mark a divide, in at least cases like Douds, Dennis, and O'Brien
opinions would need to be written, and sometimes conclude, differently.
This would not necessarily mean denying the reality of the risks to
which the actual opinions pointed. But it might mean, as I suggested in
the course of discussing O'Brien, demanding more of the government by
way of proof of likelihoods, of assignments of probability as between
minor and major manifestations of the risk, as well as some taking into
account of the probability that government efforts would ultimately
achieve their objectives. Alternatively, the impact on individuals ought
to be equivalently writ large, the effects of suppression of dissent
displayed at the same high level of magnification as the effects of
subversion.
The Grotian account, outside war, supposes hard choices and sover-
eignty bargained away. It supposes, we would guess, that the aggregate
results of such choices, judged ex post, would show no clear pattern of
winners and losers as between governments and individuals. If this per-
characterization of his draft card burning as "in 'demonstration against the war and against the
draft' ").
141. Id. at 369.
142. See id. at 372-75, 378-82.
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spective were part of our constitutional law (it would have to be if decla-
rations of war were to be meaningful regime-switches), constitutional
adjudication, in the pertinent cases, should end up similarly patternless.
